The successful rescue of the pupils and teachers abducted from three schools in Oriire Local Government Area near Ogbomosho, Oyo State, on May 15, may have provided Nigerian security agencies with a long-sought breakthrough in the fight against kidnapping for ransom—a criminal enterprise that has held the nation hostage for roughly two decades and resisted the efforts of successive administrations.
Reports indicating that security operatives employed a strategy of substituted arrest—taking into custody relatives of the kidnappers to compel the release of their captives—have generated intense public debate. While such a tactic is controversial and raises legitimate legal and ethical questions, its apparent effectiveness in securing the freedom of the abducted schoolchildren and teachers has reignited discussion about whether Nigeria may have finally stumbled upon a workable non-kinetic tool in its battle against terrorism, banditry, and kidnapping.
In diplomatic parlance, the concept is akin to a tit-for-tat strategy, where pressure is applied through reciprocal actions to achieve a desired outcome. Although such measures are generally considered inappropriate within conventional law enforcement frameworks, the extraordinary nature of Nigeria’s security crisis appears to have compelled authorities to explore unconventional solutions. I am aware of an individual whose daughter was kidnapped. When he discovered the identity of some of the kidnappers, seized their family members in a tit- for-tat manner and the kidnappers had no choice than to release his daughter.
For nearly two decades, criminal gangs, bandits, and other non-state actors have exploited weak governance structures and vast ungoverned spaces to terrorise communities, particularly in rural areas. Schoolchildren, farmers, travelers, and entire communities have been turned into bargaining chips in a lucrative kidnapping economy that has inflicted profound trauma on countless Nigerian families
Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that many Nigerians have welcomed the apparent success of the Oriire operation. To a public weary of recurring abductions and endless ransom negotiations, the safe return of the victims represents not merely a tactical victory but also a rare moment of hope.
The enthusiasm surrounding the strategy has extended beyond Oyo State. Several other victims remain in captivity, including 176 persons abducted across communities in Kwara and Niger States, as well as 41 people seized in Uba Askira, Borno State, on the same day the Oriire schoolchildren were kidnapped.
Expectedly, calls are growing for the approach employed in Oriire to be replicated elsewhere. The Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), a prominent socio-political organisation representing Northern interests, has urged security agencies to deploy similar measures to secure the release of victims still being held by bandits and insurgents across the region.
Significantly, the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) has echoed that position. Its endorsement broadens support for the strategy beyond regional or ethnic considerations and underscores the depth of national frustration with a security crisis that has spared no part of the country.
What makes the Oriire operation particularly noteworthy is that it appears to represent a shift from an overwhelmingly kinetic security doctrine to a more strategic and psychologically driven approach which is non-kinetic. For years, Nigeria’s response to insecurity has relied heavily on military force. While kinetic operations remain indispensable, they have often delivered only temporary gains, with criminal networks adapting, regrouping, and resurfacing elsewhere.
Indeed, some analysts have long argued that an exclusively military response risks further radicalising non-state actors and perpetuating cycles of violence. In contrast, non-kinetic strategies—focused on intelligence gathering, psychological pressure, community engagement, and disruption of criminal support structures—may offer more sustainable outcomes.
If reports about the Oriire operation are accurate, then Nigerian security agencies may have demonstrated that the families and support networks of kidnappers constitute a critical vulnerability that can be leveraged to compel compliance without firing a shot. Whether this approach can be institutionalised, legally justified, and applied consistently remains to be seen. Nevertheless, its apparent success has opened an important conversation about the need for innovation in confronting an unconventional security threat.
Ultimately, the real measure of success will not be the release of one group of hostages, welcome as that is. Rather, it will be whether the lessons from Oriire can be translated into a broader strategy capable of dismantling the kidnapping industry that has inflicted untold suffering on Nigerians for far too long.
For a nation desperate for effective solutions, the Oriire experience may well mark the beginning of a new chapter in the struggle against insecurity.
Having identified the weaponisation of religion and poverty as major drivers of the insecurity that continues to wreak havoc on the lives and property of our compatriots, particularly in the hinterlands, it is important to examine the legality of the concept of substituted arrest, which appears to have played a significant role in the successful rescue of the victims of the Oriire school abduction.
A review of available historical records reveals that the Italian mafia did not invent the legal concept of substituted arrest. However, it undeniably perfected the practice of targeting family members as a means of exerting pressure on its adversaries.
It is therefore important to distinguish between the legal concept and the criminal practice commonly employed by organised crime groups such as the mafia.
First, substituted arrest, as discussed in security and policy circles, differs fundamentally from what is generally described as “family hostage-taking.”” Indeed, there is no universally recognised legal doctrine specifically known as “substituted arrest.” What exists instead are related concepts and practices.
Hostage-taking, which involves detaining a relative to compel another person’s compliance, is illegal under both domestic and international law.
Similarly, collective punishment—the penalisation of family members for the actions of an individual—is prohibited under international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions.
There are, however, legal mechanisms that permit the seizure of assets linked to terrorists and criminal organisations. In some jurisdictions, authorities confiscate assets acquired through criminal activity or properties used to facilitate criminal enterprises. Similar measures have been employed in parts of Nigeria, where buildings used as operational bases by kidnappers have been demolished by state authorities. Edo state, where the governor Moday Okpebholo, for instance, has zero tolerance for criminal elements.
Consequently, it would be inaccurate to suggest that the mafia invented the concept. That is because, long before organised crime syndicates emerged in Italy, kings, warlords, clans, and tribal authorities across different civilisations employed similar methods to compel compliance or secure loyalty. What the Italian mafia did was institutionalise and systematise the practice as an instrument of organised crime.
Meanwhile, the phrase “substituted arrest” has gained prominence in contemporary security policy debates across the world. In Nigeria, it entered mainstream public discourse following reports that a similar strategy was employed during efforts to secure the release of the abducted Oriire pupils and teachers—a development that ultimately yielded positive results.
It is worth noting that, in some countries, authorities have detained associates or relatives of suspected terrorists in attempts to compel their surrender. But human rights organisations have often described such actions as forms of substituted arrest and have consistently criticised them as violations of due process and individual rights.
Likewise, across Nigeria and the wider Sahel region, where criminal groups frequently abduct the wives, children, relatives, or community leaders associated with their targets in order to extract ransoms or secure compliance. The logic is essentially the same as that employed by organised crime networks, albeit in a less structured form.
One recalls instances in Northern Nigeria where respected community elders who volunteered to negotiate with bandits, often without official authorisation, were themselves detained and subsequently held captive by the very groups they sought to engage.
Bottom Line.
The mafia did not invent the concept. Rather, desperation, weak state institutions, and the search for leverage gave rise to it. The mafia merely transformed it into a systematic instrument of coercion and intimidation.
Today, as Nigeria grapples with escalating kidnapping and banditry, and as authorities search for effective ways to contain the menace, we are witnessing variants of the same principle: applying pressure through individuals connected to the primary target.
This reality underscores why any future State Police framework must incorporate the following safeguards:
1. Comprehensive victim and witness protection programs that extend to family members.
2. Severe penalties for hostage-taking and related offences to distinguish them from underlying criminal acts.
3. Robust community intelligence networks supported by traditional rulers and monarchs, whose proximity to local communities makes them invaluable sources of grassroots information. Such mechanisms would reduce the tendency to view family members as the only available leverage points.
From the foregoing and apparently popularity of the concept of substituted arrest, it is clear that while human rights advocates may condemn it on legal and ethical grounds, some argue that extraordinary circumstances occasionally compel authorities to adopt unconventional measures.
The successful rescue of the Oriire school pupils and teachers has reignited that debate, and those opposed appear to more than those opposed.
What the situation above reveals is that Nigerians have become too traumatized by the brutality of the terrorists that some even support the reported controversial position attributed to the minister of defense Gen Chris Musa directing security personnel to shoot at sight bandits in the forests.
What is beyond dispute, however, is that the Oriire rescue operation represents a non-kinetic approach to addressing insecurity.
Before examining the advantages of non-kinetic strategies over kinetic ones, it is necessary to understand the underlying drivers of insurgency and banditry in Northern Nigeria. Among the most frequently cited factors are religious extremism and poverty.
To better understand how these factors influence vulnerable individuals and communities, I examined available research and historical experiences from societies that have faced similar crises.
The evidence suggests that religion and poverty do not, by themselves, cause kidnapping, banditry, or terrorism. Rather, they serve as accelerants and recruitment tools. In environments characterised by weak governance, limited economic opportunities, social exclusion, and easy access to weapons, these factors combine to create conditions that foster insecurity.
Notably, many of these conditions have existed in Nigeria since the return to multi-party democracy in 1999.
Therefore, while the current wave of insecurity can not be attributed solely to the incumbent administration, it remains the responsibility of the government to develop and implement sustainable solutions. In that regard, the increasing emphasis on non-kinetic measures and the refusal to incentivise criminality through ransom payments appear to be yielding encouraging results.
The successful rescue of the Oriire schoolchildren and teachers—despite the tragic loss of some teachers during the initial attack and subsequent captivity—offers evidence that alternative approaches can produce positive outcomes.
The interaction between poverty, religious extremism, and insecurity is complex. To understand it fully, it is useful to examine first how poverty creates fertile ground for criminal recruitment and violent extremism before turning to the role of religion in the process.
(1) Poverty: The Fuel and Recruitment Pool for Terrorists and Bandits.
Poverty provides the fuel and recruitment pool for terrorists and bandits because it creates conditions in which crime often appears more rewarding than legitimate work.
Groups such as Boko Haram, ISIS, and Al-Shabaab have found it relatively easy to recruit young men by offering monthly stipends ranging from $50 to $300. For families surviving on less than $2 a day, such sums can be life-changing. Consequently, the choice between “joining or starving” becomes a harsh reality for many vulnerable individuals.
Kidnapping for ransom has also emerged as a major contributor to insecurity in Nigeria. What began as an isolated criminal enterprise has evolved into a thriving industry. A single successful kidnapping operation can generate income equivalent to what a farmer may earn over an entire decade.
Even bandits who previously relied on cattle rustling as their primary source of income now find kidnapping more attractive. Abducting schoolchildren, teachers, or travellers often yields enormous ransom payments while exposing perpetrators to less risk than attempting to sell stolen cattle in regulated markets where they can be identified and arrested.
As experience has shown, economic desperation lowers the threshold for violence.
Another important factor is the loss of state legitimacy.
When governments fail to provide essential services such as schools, healthcare facilities, roads, and other basic infrastructure, public trust inevitably erodes. For many years, this was the reality in large parts of Northern Nigeria. In response, successive governments have sought to bridge these gaps through initiatives such as the establishment of Almajiri schools and the creation of federal universities across the region to address the alarming number of out-of-school children, estimated at between 15 and 20 million.
While these interventions are commendable, they came after decades of neglect. During such periods of state absence, criminal groups often step in to provide alternative forms of authority and protection, thereby winning the loyalty of local populations.
Land and resource conflicts also stem from poverty, climate change, and desertification. Competition over farmland, water resources, and grazing routes has intensified across Northern Nigeria and the wider Sahel region, becoming a significant driver of violence and banditry.
The critical point, however, is that poverty alone does not create terrorists. While it makes individuals more vulnerable to recruitment, an ideology, criminal enterprise, or extremist network is usually required to channel that vulnerability into organised violence.
(2) Religion: The Justification and Mobilising Force.
Contrary to popular belief, religion itself is rarely the root cause of insecurity. Rather, the problem arises when religion is weaponised.
One of the ways religion fuels insecurity is through ideological justification. Terrorist organisations frequently manipulate religious texts to portray violence as a “holy war,” a “defense of the faith,” or a process of “purification.” Such narratives provide moral cover for violent acts and make compromise more difficult.
Religion can also be exploited to create an “us versus them” mentality. By defining identity primarily through religious affiliation, extremist groups establish clear distinctions between perceived allies and enemies.
For example, Boko Haram’s ideological message has often been summarised as “Western education is forbidden.” In some areas, criminal groups have sought to frame conflicts through a Christian-versus-Muslim lens, particularly in disputes involving farmers and herders, thereby mobilising vulnerable populations along sectarian lines.
Religious institutions, schools, preachers, and networks can also be exploited as recruitment and mobilisation platforms. Shared beliefs often foster strong group cohesion, making it easier for extremist organisations to attract and retain followers.
Furthermore, religious charities, donations, and transnational networks can sometimes be manipulated to provide funding, legitimacy, and logistical support for extremist causes. Leaders of such movements frequently invoke divine authority to justify their actions and reinforce their influence over followers.
The indictment of terrorism sponsored recently identified by the authorities and USA and shared with Nigerian authorities is amongst the right decisions aimed at tightening the noose around insecurity in Nigeria in a bid to end it in non-kinetic ways.
Having said that, religion alone does not generate insecurity.
There are deeply religious societies around the world that experience little or no religious insurgency. Likewise, poverty alone does not automatically produce criminality. Many poor countries have relatively low levels of terrorism and organised violence.
More often than not, a third factor is present: weak state institutions, corruption, the proliferation of weapons, or political actors who exploit poverty and religious identity in pursuit of personal, ethnic, or political agendas.
The armed conflicts in Libya and surrounding areas have made arms and ammunition more easily accessible even
as the recent report that foreigners were sighted amongst the bandits recently operating in the northern axis also attest to the international dimension.
What Can Reduce Insecurity?
A quick research that l conducted on the matter suggests that the most effective long-term antidotes to insecurity are economic development, job creation, access to education, and accelerated infrastructure development. These measures shrink the recruitment pool available to criminal organisations and extremist groups.
Equally important is good governance, underpinned by responsive policing, effective courts, and reliable public services. These institutions help restore public confidence and reduce the appeal of criminal alternatives.
In many respects, these are among the objectives President Bola Tinubu’s administration is pursuing through increased allocation of funds to state governments due to the growing revenue accruing to the federal government arising from petrol subsidy removal now driving the investments in infrastructure- roads,air and sea ports across the country, the National Education Loan Fund (NELFUND) democratizing education nationwide, and ongoing efforts to strengthen state and local policing mechanisms that largely disappeared following the military coup of 1966.
In light of the current challenges of insecurity, clearly state governments need to invest more in technology to achieve a more comprehensive and effective security of lives and properties in their jurisdictions as governor Peter Mbah of Enugu state has done.
There is also a critical religious dimension to the solution. Credible religious leaders must be empowered to challenge extremist narratives and expose distortions of faith used by terrorist groups to recruit followers. By separating religion from the politics of violence, clerics can help inoculate communities against radicalisation.
The Case for Non-kinetic Strategies
The successful rescue of the Oriire schoolchildren and teachers demonstrates the effectiveness of non-kinetic approaches to security.
By disrupting the finances, intelligence networks, and logistical structures of criminal groups, as was done in the Oriire case, security agencies can achieve outcomes that military force alone may not deliver.
Although, the situation with kidnappers in the northern axis may be different as members of the families of the criminals may not be available for subsituted arrest as was done in Oriire because the criminals are mainly marauders dwelling in the forests.
Nevertheless the other strategies of encircling and choking their supply channels can also be efficacious.
The lesson is clear: reliance solely on kinetic measures—the use of armed force—cannot resolve insecurity. Without complementary non-kinetic measures such as economic development, effective governance, and counter-radicalisation initiatives, the problem merely shifts from one location to another. As Americans often say, it amounts to “kicking the can down the road.”
This is the central argument I advance in my new book, The Imperative of State Police in Nigeria, scheduled for public presentation in Abuja on September 10.
Poverty supplies the manpower for criminal organisations. The misuse of religion provides the moral justification and narrative. State weakness creates the operating space, particularly within the vast ungoverned forests that exist across the country.
State policing is not a complete solution, but it is undoubtedly part of the answer. Local police officers understand the terrain, speak the language, know the communities, and work closely with traditional rulers, religious leaders, and local stakeholders to disrupt recruitment before it begins.
While state police alone can not eliminate poverty-driven or religiously motivated insecurity, it would represent a powerful counterforce.
Chibok and Oriire: A Tale of 2 Security Responses
At this point, it is useful to contrast the abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls with the recent Oriire kidnapping.
Although the Chibok abduction occurred in 2014, the broader point remains valid. More than a decade later,to be specific a dozen years after, several of the girls remain unaccounted for despite extensive military operations.
That is probably due to late intervention or lack of concerted efforts or non synergistic action of all the relevant security agencies as was the case in the Oriire abduction,thus enabling the bandits to move the victims beyond the confines of Nigeria and likely sold into slavery as they had threatened hence about 83 Chibok girls including Leah Sharibu remain missing.
By contrast, the Oriire pupils and teachers, abducted on May 15, were released on July 10 after less than two months in captivity.
According to the account provided by Army spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Danjuma Jonah Danjuma, the rescue operation involved isolating the kidnappers, restricting their movement, disrupting their supply routes, and exerting pressure on their support networks. These measures appear to have complemented conventional military operations and contributed significantly to the successful outcome.
The Next Challenge: Prevention.
While the successful rescue of the Oriire victims provides valuable lessons, it remains only one piece of a much larger puzzle. A lot more needs to be done to achieve holistic success.
Rescuing hostages after an abduction has occurred is important. However,preventing such abductions in the first place is even more critical.
To protect schools—which remain attractive soft targets for criminal groups—the Safe Schools Initiative driven by the former prime minister of the UK, Gordon Brown under the auspices of the UN should be revived and strengthened.
In that regard, corporate Nigeria can play a pivotal role in the effort to protect our children and facilitate their right to go to school and get educated in defiance of Boko Haram doctrine translated into English language as -Western education is taboo.
One practical intervention would be the construction of perimeter fences around vulnerable schools, particularly those located in rural and high-risk areas nationwide. Such barriers would make it considerably more difficult for armed groups to ride into school compounds and abduct children with impunity.
Corporate entities can adopt a school to fence and it may not cost more than twenty million naira to fence a school.
Corporate Nigeria has demonstrated its capacity to support national priorities before. During the COVID-19 pandemic, private-sector organisations funded medical facilities and emergency interventions. Similarly, the rehabilitation of the National Arts Theatre in Iganmu, Lagos—now renamed the Prof. Wole Soyinka Theatre—showed what can be achieved through collective corporate action.
Today, the nation faces another urgent challenge.
Nigerians are once again looking to the corporate sector to demonstrate leadership and social responsibility. The private sector has repeatedly risen to the occasion in moments of national need.
One can only hope that, this time, too, it will not disappoint.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR:
Onyibe, an entrepreneur, public policy analyst, author, democracy advocate, development strategist, an alumnus of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Massachusetts, USA, a Commonwealth Institute scholar, and a former commissioner in the Delta State government, sent this piece from Lagos.
